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Wise and Baker: Some Comments on Rate Making in West Virginia

SOME COMMENTS ON RATE MAKING IN WEST VIRGINL'&
CHARLEs C. WISE and BEN K. BAER*

The regulation of rates is of growing concern to everyone since,
directly or indirectly, the entire population is affected by the cost
of water, gas, electricity and public communication and transportation. Nearly all customers have greatly increased their use of
utility services in the past decade. Moreover, the problem has
grown in importance because there has been a larger number of
rate proceedings instituted before the Public Service Commission
since the close of World War II than in any other comparable
period in the history of regulation in this state.' Furthermore,
there has been a multiplicity of rate applications by the same
utilities, as for example, those engaged in the communication
business, which is of such nature that the addition of each new
telephone increases costs generally, and those which make use of an
exhaustible natural resource such as natural gas requiring new
sources of supply, often at great distances at higher costs.
The West Virginia lawyer may feel some reluctance in advising
clients respecting rate proceedings for several reasons:
1. The Supreme Court of Appeals has declined to review any
major rate order for twenty years, 2 and, in any event, the decisions
of this court shed but little light on modern rate making.
2. The reports, opinions and orders of the Public Service
Commission are not generally read by the profession as are the
3
court reports.
3. Since rate regulation is complex and essentially a legislative function, the subject is given but cursory and inadequate
4
treatment in the usual legal texts.
4. The many ramifications of a process consisting of an
involved mass of accounting and engineering principles applied
to the realities of variable operating problems, all of which must
be viewed in the light of a rapidly changing economic climate,
*Members of the Kanawha County Bar.
1 The reports of the commission include 192 rate orders
(other than for
carriers) during the period 1944 through 1952. Of these, 6 were for electric,
38 for gas, 78 for water, and 70 for telephone companies.
2 The last comprehensive rate case reviewed was City of Wheeling v.
Natural Gas Co., 115 W. Va. 149, 175 S.E. 339 (1934).
3The reports of the commission are published annually. They contain
orders, opinions and valuable statistical information.
4 There is no text dealing with rate making in West Virginia. Public
utility law treatises are of ancient vintage. For a modem, but general, source.
see Wx.cn, PREPARING FOR THE RATE CAsE (1954).
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are somewhat forbidding to lawyers, including those who have had
experience in administrative law. The traditional reliance upon
general principles enunciated by the courts offers but little comfort
in a rate case.
LEGAL BASES OF REGULATION

Rate regulation is, of course, founded upon the principle that
"when private property is devoted to public use, it is subject to
public regulation". 5 Neither this principle nor the mechanics of
rate making, however, are new; both had their origin in the
common law. Rates at that time were fixed by the king's license
or charter but even then subject to the requirement of reasonableness.8 The classical legal concept of "business affected with a
public interest", which became the foundation for regulation in
the United States, was first hammered out in the commentaries
7
of the great Lord Chief Justice Hale.
Regulation in this country commenced even before the Revolution when certain colonies resorted to price fixing. The tug of
war between the regulators and those who opposed governmental
intervention was bitter but inconclusive until 1877 when the
Supreme Court of the United States in the celebrated case of Munn
v. Illinois took Lord Chief Justice Hale's principle of public control and made it the law of the land." Modern rate regulation dates
from this case.
With the constitutionality of price fixing established, regulation of utility rates was undertaken by direct legislative enactment,
but this method was soon found to be burdensome and ill-suited
to the expanding economy.9 By reason of the rapid growth of the
population and the great increase in the number of public service
corporations, it became impracticable for legislatures to accomplish
regulation by specific enactments. These developments, coupled
with the inadequacy and inequality of recovering overcharges in
courts, led to a revolutionary change in the form of administrative
bodies as creatures of the legislature to perform the function of
regulation. State commissions were thus created and became
active.o The federal government also created regulatory com5 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877).

6Among those regulated were common carriers, innkeepers, ferrymen,
millers, and bakers. See SMITH, A TFLPHONE RATE CASE 1 (1941).
7De PortibusMarius, 1 HARGRAVE, LAw TRACTs 78 (1787); De Jure Marius,
id. at 6.
894 U.S. 113 (1877).
9 See Trustees of Saratoga Springs, 191 N.Y. 123, 83 N.E. 693 (1908); Budd v.
New York, 143 U.S. 517 (1891); Dow v. Beidelman, 125 U.S, 680 (1887)..
10 The right of a state to regulate railroad rates by a commission was
upheld by the Supreme Court in 1886. Stone v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co.,
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missions. 1 As a result, rate making underwent a radical transformation from the fixed standards of a franchise or legislative act or
a retroactive determination of reasonableness by the courts to a
method whereby rates were to be determined by a commission to
operate in the future so as to secure stability and uniformity.
The growth of commissions, both federal and state, has posed
constitutional problems, the resolution of which affect rate making
today. The delineation of the scope of state as opposed to federal
regulation has become increasingly important, since many public
service corporations operate locally in a number of states and in
interstate commerce, thus causing complex regulatory problems.
Although it is now firmly established that state commissions retain
their traditional power to regulate intrastate sales to consumers
by electric, natural gas and telephone utilities, and the Federal
Power Commission and Federal Communications Commission exercise the right to regulate interstate sales for resale, troublesome
12
questions remain in this area of rate making.
Rate making by both the states and the federal government is,
of course, subject to constitutional restrictions. The keystone of
the constitutional guaranty was stated in the case of Munn v.
Illinois: the right of the state to regulate is based upon the general

116 U.S. 307 (1886). In 1907, Georgia, New York and Wisconsin established
utility commissions with broad rate fixing powers, and other states soon followed.
The West Virginia commission was created in 1913.
-1 Federal regulation commenced with the creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission, 49 U.S.CA. 1, in 1887, although this commission originally
did not have rate fixing authority. The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.A. 77a,
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. 78a, regulate the issuance
of securities by utilities and practices pertaining to their sale. The Federal
Power Act of 1920, 16 U.S.C.A. 791, gave jurisdiction to the Federal Power
Commission to regulate interstate rates for electricity. The Communications
Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C.A. 151, delegated the regulation of interstate telephone
and telegraph companies to the Federal Communications Commission. In 1938
Congress passed the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C.A. 717, giving the Federal Power
Commission jurisdiction over the sale of gas for resale in interstate
commerce.
12 The transmission of utility service from one state to another has from an
early time been established to be a transaction in interstate commerce. See
Pensacola Telegraph v. Western Union, 96 U.S. 1 (1877) (communications);
American Ex. Co. v. Iowa, 196 U.S. 133 (1904) (gas); and Mill Creek Coal &
Coke Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 84 W. Va. 662, 100 S.E. 557 (1919) (electricity). States may regulate intrastate rates, Public Utilities Comm'n vj
Landon, 249 U.S. 236 (1918); Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Public Utilities Service
Comm'n, 252 U.S. 23 (1919); but may not regulate interstate rates, Missouri
ex rel. Barrett v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 265 U.S. 298 (1923); Public Utilities
Comm'n v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co., 273 U.S. 83 (1926). The question
of whether a state commission may disallow costs incurred under tariffs on file
with a federal commission has not been authoritatively settled. See Amere Gas
Utilities Co., 1 P.U.R.3d 280 (W. Va. Public Service Comm'n 1953); and East
Ohio Gas Co. v. City of Cleveland, 56 P.U.R. (N.S.) 89 (1945).
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police power, but its exercise must be reasonable and avoid a taking
of private property for public use without just compensation."3
The method of computing rates so as to satisfy these constitutional requirements has been a cause of never-ending litigation in
the courts. It is no easy matter to give effect to the many economic,
social and legal aspects underlying rate regulation so as to arrive
at a rate of return to the company which fully protects its interest
as well as that of the consumer and the public generally. Throughout the history of regulation, the fundamental problem has been
that of developing a standard of measurement. If rates are to be
above the level of confiscation, provision must be made not only
for costs that are properly incurred in furnishing public service
but also for a return to the investor. The determination of a
proper "return" has caused considerable difficulties since it involves
determination of a proper rate of return and of the basic utility
investment. As a standard of measurement, commissions early
adopted the rate base formula under which a public service corporation is allowed a reasonable rate of return upon the rate
base plus ordinary operating expenses and depreciation. 14 The
determination of what component parts are to constitute the rate
base and the standards to ascertain the value of the propery have
resulted and continue to result in wide disagreement. The use of
the rate base, however, remains today as the accepted method before
most commissions.' 5
At least six different methods of determining the rate base
have been advanced from time to time: (1) rate base computed by
amount and value of outstanding stocks and indebtedness;"0 (2)
original cost of property when first devoted to public service;"
(3) original cost less depreciation reserve;' 8 (4) reproduction cost
i 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
34 The chief function of the rate base is to provide a basis of measurement.
See Chicago, Milwaukee & St. P. Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1889); Smyth
v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1897).
'5 Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Commerce Commn, 414 I1. 275, 111 N.E.2d
329 (1953); City of Marietta v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 148 Ohio St. 173,
74 N.E.2d 74 (1947); Commonwealth Telephone Co. v. Public Service Comm'n,
252 Wis. 481, 32 N.E.2d 247 (1941).
26 This was argued unsuccessfully in Smyth v. Ames, 169 US. 466 (1897). See
also Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co., 212 U.S. 1 (1908); And Huntington v.
Public Service Commn, 89 W. Va. 703, 110 S.E. 192 (1921). Although early
favored as a measure of the rate base, it was soon rejected since in many
instances capital stock was given as a bonus to bondholders, in others, bonds
were sold at a discount, and large promotional ex penses were not uncommon.
17 Original cost generally means the actual cost of properties without
deduction for accrued reserves. Railroad Comm'n of California v. Pacific Gas
& Electric Co., 302 U.S. 388 (1937).
'$ This is original cost adjusted to reflect depreciation and depletion. See
West v. C. & P. Tel. Co., 295 U.S. 662 (1934).
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new less depreciation;10 (5) the amount "prudently" invested by21the
stockholders;20 and (6) the fair market value of the property.
The Supreme Court from 1898 until 1943 adhered to the rule
that the rate base should be made up of a combination of these
values or that the basis of all calculations as to the reasonableness
of rates must be "the fair value of the property devoted to public
service." The court's formula for the rate base was stated in the
case of Smyth v. Ames, 2 2 in the following language:
"We hold, however, that the basis of all calculations as to the
reasonableness of rates to be charged by a corporation maintaining a highway under legislative sanction must be the
fair value of the property being used by it for the convenience
of the public. And, in order to ascertain that value, the
original cost of construction, the amount expended in permanent improvements, the amount and market value of its
bonds and stock, the present as compared with the original
cost of construction, the probable earning capacity of the
company under particular rates prescribed by statute and
the sum required to meet operating expenses, are all matters
for consideration, and are to be given such weight.as may be
just and right in each case. We do not say that there may
not be other matters to be regarded in estimating the value of
the property. What the company is entitled to ask is the
fair return upon the value of that which it employs for the
public convenience. On the other hand, what the public is
entitled to demand is that no more be exacted from it for the
use of a public highway than the services rendered by it are
reasonably worth."
This rule of fair value was thereafter generally adopted by state
commissions and courts, and rate base valuation became a conflict
between the competing principles of original and reproduction
cost. The Supreme Court in cases before it consistently remanded
commission orders where the commission had solely considered or
23
used one method of valuation.
19 Reproduction cost is an estimate of the cost to reproduce the properties
now, less depreciation. See Georgia Ry. & P. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 262 U.S.
625 (1922). This method includes appreciation of property in the rate base,
but has been subjected to criticism as representing mere estimates. At first
reproduction cost was welcomed by commissions as evidence of value, because
estimates then indicated values lower than original cost. See McCardle v.
Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U.S. 400 (1926).
20 See the concurring opinion of Justice Brandeis in Missouri ex rel. S. W.
Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 262 U.S. 275, 289 (1923).
21 This method was rejected by the West Virginia commission in the 1950
C. &. P. Telephone case, 87 PSC REP. 32.
-2 See note 14 supra.
23 Minnesota Rate Cases (Simpson v. Shepard), 230 U.S. 352 (1912); St.
Louis & O'Fallan Ry. v. United States, 279 U.S. 461 (1928); West v. C. & P.
Tel. Co., 295 U.S. 662 (1934); Bluefield Water Works & Imp. Co. v. Public
Service Comm'n, 262 U.S. 679 (1922); McCardle v. Indianapolis Co., 272 U.S. 400
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In 1943, however, the Supreme Court shifted its emphasis
from the "fair value" approach to the so-called "end result" theory
and held that methods used by a commission in establishing rates
are not subject to review on constitutional grounds so long as the
end result is just and reasonable. The new theory of the Court
24
was stated in the celebrated Hope Natural Gas case:
"We held in Federal Power Commission v. Natural Gas
Pipeline Company, 315 U.S. 575, 86 Law Ed. 1037, 62 S. Ct.
736, supra, that the Commission was not bound to the use
of any single formula or combination of formulae in determining rates. Its rate-making function, moreover, involves
the making of 'pragmatic adjustments'. * * * Under the
statutory standard of 'just and reasonable' it is the result
reached, not the method employed, which is controlling.
* * * It is not the theory but the impact of the rate order
which counts. If the total effect of the rate order cannot
be said to be unjust and unreasonable, judicial inquiry under
the Act is at an end. The fact that the method employed
to reach that result may contain infirmities is not important.
* * * The rate making process under the Act, i. e., the filing
of 'just and reasonable' rates involves a balancing of the
investor and consumer interests. 0 * * In view of these various
considerations we cannot say that an annual return of
$291,314 is not 'just and reasonable' within the meaning of
the Act. Rates which enable the company to operate successfully, to maintain its financial integrity, to attract capital,
and to compensate its investors for the risks assumed certainly cannot be condemned as invalid, even though they
might produce only a meager return on the so-called 'fair
value' rate base."
Theoretically, the Hope case may mean that a rate base is
no longer necessary in computing reasonable rates. Despite the
vigorous efforts of certain state commissions and the Federal Power
Commission to minimize the importance of the rate base, however,
the majority of commissions still make use of the formula. Since
the Hope case, the states may in general be grouped into four
categories: (1) those continuing the pre-Hope policy of using
original cost or prudent investment; (2) those faithful to the true
fair value rule of considering all elements; -(3) those adopting
original cost as the rate base although ostensibly adhering to the
fair value rule; and (4) those adopting either original cost or
(1926); San Diego Land & Town Co. v. Jasper, 189 U.S. 439 (1902); Los Angeles
Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Railroad Comm'n, 289 U.S. 287 (1932)
24 Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 590 (1943).
Five opinions were rendered in this case, and argument as to their meaning
still continues.
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prudent investment as a specific result of the Hope case.25 It is
under the third category that West Virginia should be classified.
REGULATION IN WEST VIRGINIA

The history of regulation of public service corporations in
West Virginia has paralleled that of the other states in large
measure. Its origin is found in the common law and in the West
Virginia Constitution,28 which mandatorily requires the legislature
to pass laws applicable to all railroads and to establish reasonable
"maximum rates or charges". The legislature at an early date
classified railroads according to their gross annual earnings and
set maximum limits for the charges. 27 Statutes were enacted containing penalties enforceable by the state. 28 Furthermore, since a
business classified as a public utility was under an affirmative
common law duty to charge "reasonable rates", a breach of such
duty formed the basis for an action brought by an injured party
29
to recover any overcharge.
In 1913, the Public Service Commission of West Virginia was
3
established.O
The validity of the act creating the commission came
under immediate attack and the Supreme Court of Appeals sustained the delegation of legislative powers as to utilities generally
in the case of United Fuel Gas Co. v. Public Service Comm'n,3 '
which remains, perhaps, the most definitive statement of the power
and authority of the commission.
It is clear from the act itself and the interpretation given it
in the United Fuel Gas case that the West Virginia commission
derives its power and jurisdiction wholly from the statute, This
jurisdiction is defined in Chapter 24, Article 2, Section 1 of the
West Virginia Code to include all public utilities in the state. The
general powers of the commission under the original act as
amended are now contained in Chapter 24, Article 2, Section 2 of
the West Virginia Code, as follows:
"The commission is hereby given power to investigate all
rates, methods and practices of public utilities subject to the
provisions of this chapter; . . .The Commission may change
any intrastate rate, charge or toll which is unjust or unreason25 For an interesting commentary of the aftermath of the Hope case, see
Rose, The Hope Case and Public Utility Valuation in the States, 54 CoL. L. REv.
188 (1954).
20 Art. XI, § 9.
27 W. Va. Acts 1872-3, c. 227.
28 See Coal & Coke Ry. v. Conley & Avis, 67 W. Va. 129, 67 S.E. 613 (1910).
29W. Va. Transportation Co. v. Sweitzer, 25 W. Va. 434 (1885).
-s0W. Va. Acts 1913, c. 9.
.31173 W. Va. 571, 80 SYE. 931 (1914).
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able or any interstate charge with respect to matters of a purely
local nature which have not been regulated by or pursuant to
act of Congress and may prescribe such rate, charge or toll as
would be just and reasonable.... But in no case shall the
rate, toll or charge be more than the service is reasonably
worth, considering the cost thereof...."
Prior to the Hope case, the West Virginia commission had
been firmly committed to the fair value basis of rate making. The
adoption of the Uniform System of Accounts in 1937 foreshadowed
the possibility of the use of an original cost rate base, but just as
in the federal sphere, apparently no one anticipated that original
cost would become within a short period of time the chief, if not
the only, standard of fixing rates. 32 From 1939 up to World War II,
nearly all of the cases before the commigsion were on its own
initiative to reduce rates, and in nearly every instance fair value
was predicated upon cost of reproduction new less depreciation.,'
The chief issue in these earlier cases centered around differences
in estimates of the reproduction cost. The original cost concept
for rate purposes stems from the Uniform System of Accounts, but
regulatory bodies at that time generally insisted that a system of
accounts requiring the original cost method could not be conclusive for rate purposes.3 4 However, once the United States Supreme
Court had sanctioned the "end result" theory, the Federal Power
Commission began to use the net original cost rate base exclusively 5 and what began as an act of refinement or reformation for
accounting purposes in 1937 gradually became in West Virginia
the approved method of the commission for computing the rate
base. As early as 1941, the West Virginia commission began to
write in terms of "original investment", 6 but the first case appearing in the commission reports and indicating an exclusive original
a2 The West Virginia commission has prescribed uniform systems of accounts
for all major utility classifications.
33 See Black Diamond Power Co., 26 PSC REP. 76 (1939); Appalachian
Electric Power Co., 28 PSC REP. 49 (1940).
34 Mr. Charles W. Smith, Chief, Bureau of Accounts, Finance and Rates, of
the Federal Power Commission, and a leading exponent of original cost during
the period of its intensified promotion, did not contend that the accounting
result would be synonymous with value but rather a check on other evidence
of value in a rate proceeding. See American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v.
United
States, 299 U.S. 232 (1936).
35
1n 1952 NARUC reported that "a rate base consisting of depreciated
original cost or net investment plus working capital still receives exclusive or
substantial
weight in most final determinations."
3
6 See Chesapeake Light 8&Water Co., 29 PSG REP. 4 (1942); Mountain
State Gas Co., 29 PSC REP. 36 (1942); Interstate Utilities Co., 30 PSC REV. 40

(1943).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol57/iss1/3

8

Wise and Baker: Some Comments on Rate Making in West Virginia
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
cost basis is that of Beckley Water Company in 19437 The reports show numerous succeeding orders where the commission adhered strictly to an original cost rate base.38
The most comprehensive discussion of a rate base found in
the reports of the West Virginia commission occurs in the 1949
Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Company case,39 where the
commission states:
"Utility rates are generally conceded to be just and reasonable
if they beget operating revenues sufficient to pay operating
expenses including provision for depreciation and taxes and
a reasonable return on the fair value of the property devoted
to public use and, in West Virginia, 'in no case shall the
rate, toll, or charge be more than the service is reasonably
worth, considering the cost thereof, (Chapter 24, idem,
article 2, section 2). In order to determine whether an increase in the existing rates of respondent is warranted, it is
necessary first to determine the fair value of its property
devoted to public use and whether its present net operating
income constitutes a reasonable return thereon."
In the proceeding before the commission, evidence was offered by
the company as to: (1) prudent investment, (2) original cost, and
(3) reproduction cost. The commission states that it considered
all three theories, but concluded that the average of the original
cost studies for the test year represented the fair value of the
property devoted to public service and was adopted as the rate base.
That the West Virginia commission is now firmly committed
to the original cost base may be seen by its recent statement in the
Amere Gas Utilities Company case in 1953:40
"The respondent's rate base, as set forth in its exhibits, is
based upon original cost of the property. * * * This method
of arriving at the value of the gas plant in service is the
same as that used by the commission in recent years in all
of the rate proceedings before it involving major utilities.
It is also the same method followed by the Federal Power
Commission and a great majority of state regulatory agencies.
The use of this method at the present time results in placing
a lesser value on the utility's property than would be arrived
37

80 PSC REP. 45 (1943).

38 Town of Eastbank, 31 PSC REP. 62 (1944); Wayne Gas Co., 33 PSC Rr.
11 (1945). In Webster Springs Telephone Co., 34 PSC REP. 35 (1946), the

commission found it was in a position to ascertain "from the accounting records
...its investment in the property .. " See also C. & P. Tel. Co., 85 PSC REP.

17 (1948); Morgantown Water Co., 86 PSC REP'. 26 (1949); Monongahela Power

Co., 86 PSC REP.44 (1948); W. Va. Water Service Co., 86 PSC REP. 68 (1949),
88 PSG REP. 24 (1950); Bluefield Telephone Co., 38 PSC REP. 33 (1951); C. :P.
Tel. Co., 88 PSC RnP. 80 (1950), 39 PS0 REP. 67 (1951).
:3 37 PSC REP. 32 (1950).
40

1

P.U.R.3d 280 (1953).
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at if a reproduction new or fair value rate base were established, but the commission believes the original cost rate base
to be the fairest means of valuing a utility's property and
not subject to the constant variations inherent in the reproduction new method, which variations may, from time to
time, depending on current economic conditions, unduly
favor either the utility or the consumer."
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has done
nothing to disturb the original cost formula of the commission. In
the first case concerning the constitutionality of the Public Service
Commission statute, 41 the court established narrow confines for
judicial intervention in the rate making process. Rates established
by the commission are final and not subject to review by the
court unless (1) beyond the power which the commission could
constitutionally exercise, (2) beyond its statutory power, or (3)
based upon a mistake of law. The court has consistently adhered
to its original position and has declined to determine whether rates
are confiscatory if based upon supporting evidence. 42 The result
has been that since the creation of the commission, the court has
reviewed rates on only eight occasions and has declined to review
any major rate order in recent years. Of the eight major cases,
only three contain substantial interpretative language. In the
first of these, City of Huntington v. Public Service Comm'n,43 the
court announced its allegiance to the rate base method of fixing
rates and the fair value rule of Smyth v. Ames. 4 4 Some foreshadowing of the Hope rationale appears in the court's opinion,
however, in the statement:
"There is no immutable standard for the measurement of the
income a company serving the public is entitled to under all
circumstances and conditions, and in the very nature of
things there could not be. The facts of each case differ from
the facts of every other case. No two of them are any more
alike than are two or more faces."
The court, however, interprets the rule of fair value in this and
other cases45 as excluding any one method. In the last major rate
41 United Fuel Gas Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 73 W. Va. 571, 80 S.E. 931
(1914).
42 Huntington v. Public Service Comm'n, 101 W. Va. 378, 133 S.E. 144
(1926); Pittsburgh & W. Va. Gas Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 101 W. Va. 63,
132 S.E. 497 (1926); Bluefield Waterworks & Imp. Co. v. Public Service Comr'n,
89 W. Va. 736, 110 S.E. 205 (1921).
43 89W . Va. 703, 110 S.E. 192 (1921).
44 169 U.S. 466 (1897).
45 City of Charleston v. Public Service Comm'n, 86 W. Va. 536, 103 S.E.
673 (1920); Bluefield Waterworks & Imp. Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 89 W. Va
736, 110 S.E. 205 (1921).
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case reviewed by the court, City of Wheeling v. Natural Gas Co.,46
the court strongly indicated that the commission should give
more consideration to original cost and less to reproduction cost:
"This Court, since its decision in Huntington v. Public
Service Commission, 89 W. Va. 703, 110 S. E. 192, down to
the present, has repeatedly expressed the view that experts'
testimony on reproduction new, etc., is at best most unsatisfactory, and that at least some consideration should be given
original cost, where the conditions justify it. The Court,
speaking through Judge Hatcher, in Charleston v. Public
Service Commission, 110 W. Va. 254, 159 S. E. 38, calls
attention to the fact that the United States Supreme Court in
reversing this court in Bluefield Water Works and Improvement Company v. Public Service Commission, 263 U. S.679,
43 S.Ct. 675, 67 L. Ed. 1176, did not say that evidence of
reproduction costs, less depreciation, should be given even
controlling much less exclusive weight. And that statement
is amply supported by the recent opinion of Mr. Chief Justice
Hughes in Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Railroad Commission of California, 289 U. S.287, 53 S.Ct. 637, 77 L. ed.
1180.
"We, therefore, direct that the commission review its finding
on present fair value, giving due regard to the original cost
of the property. And, at this juncture, suggest that the
enhanced values at which the purchases of other gas properties have been entered upon the books of the utility be
carefully scrutinized."
This opinion is the sole comprehensive analysis of rate making by
our Supreme Court of Appeals.
In general, the decisions of the Supreme Court of Appeals
have furnished little assistance to the commission in fulfilling its
duties of establishing reasonable rates. Although both the court
and commission have consistently stated adherence to the rule of
fair value, they have not in practice followed the holding of
Smyth v. Ames. Evidencing an early preference for original cost,
the commission has in practical effect ruled out all other methods
of establishing the rate base, thus modifying the traditional concept
of fair value-all apparently without disapproval of the court.
Both commission and court have in reality adopted the principles
of the Hope case rather than that of Smyth v. Ames. For in the
last analysis, the Supreme Court of Appeals has based its determinations upon pragmatic results and not upon methods, and this
has given the West Virginia commission practically unlimited
prerogative in rate making. Although the commission continues
46

115 W. Va. 149, 175 S.E. 339 (1934).
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to proclaim its faithfulness to the principles of fair value, original
cost remains the sole determinant of the rate base in West Virginia.

A RESUME OF A RATE CASE
Proceedings for rate increases may be initiated either by filing
a formal petition, under rules of the commission,47 or a new rate
schedule, as provided by Code 24-2-4. Statutory requirements for
notice to the public must be complied with, and are generally
specified in the order of the commission setting a case for hearing.
Throughout the proceeding, the company has the burden of proof.
The first stage in preparing and presenting a rate case is the
development of a cost of fservice for a so-called test period which is
generally the preceding twelve months. This cost of service customarily is made up of four major factors: (1) operating expenses,
(2) depredation and depletion allowances for property consumed
in providing service, (3) taxes, and (4) return to the investor for
the use of his money computed by the rate base-rate of return
formula. The commission staff often makes independent study
and offers evidence.
Tnm ORIGINAL

Cosr RATE BASE

The original cost for rate making purposes is established by
the books and records of the company according to the classification of accounts required by the commission.48 Where original
cost figures are not available, an estimated original cost study is
made and then booked. The customary test of whether property
may properly be included in the rate base depends on whether it
can be said to be "used or useful" in rendering public service.
Property held for future use is often challenged by protestants.
In addition to the original cost of plant, the commission allows as
part of the rate base, materials and supplies required in day to
day operations and a sum for working capital computed on the
basis of forty-five days for gas and electric utilities which bill
subsequent to the rendering of service, and, on a basis of fifteen
days for utilities which bill in advance, such as telephone companies.
47 See "Rules and Regulations for the Government of the Construction and
Filing of Tariffs of Public Utilities and Common Carriers", promulgated by
the commission in 1940.
48 Original cost, sometimes referred to as "aboriginal cost", is defined in
the Uniform System of Accounts for Electric Utilities, prescribed by the commission, as the cost of utility plant "at the time it was first placed in service,
whether by the accounting utility or by a predecessor or constituent public
utility or non-utility". The commission's practice is to average the plant
account for the year rather than accept or use the year end figure.
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The commission at the present time refuses to include in the
rate base, over protest of many utilities, acquisition adjustments
and construction work in progress.
Acquisition adjustments represent the difference between the
actual cost of property to the utility and its historical "original
cost". Many public utility systems in the state today are comprised
of a number of small operating companies acquired over many
years at an actual cost greatly exceeding the original cost of
perhaps a half century ago. The failure of the commission to
allow this differential for rate making purposes excludes a substantial portion of the actual cost to the utility of acquiring and
putting together the systems which permit cheaper and more
efficient service. The treatment given to acquisition adjustments
stems in part from the Uniform System of Accounts which requires
their segregation for accounting purposes.49 The initial Federal
Power Commission regulations made it clear that the segregation
of such adjustments was not to be construed as determining or
controlling their consideration in rate proceedings. Likewise, the
West Virginia commission has stated that the accounting requirements should not be controlling for rate making purposes, but in
no case has the commission allowed acquisition adjustment items
as part of the rate base. 50 Where these adjustments represent
sound investment in the interest of better and more economical
public service based upon arms-length transactions, a large number
of other regulatory bodies hold that they should be included in
the rate base as a part of the utility's investment in property
devoted to public use. 51
The position of the commission with regard to construction
work in progress likewise may be inconsistent with the original
cost rate making concept which the commission has adopted, and
work a hardship in times such as these. Public service corporations
today have large amounts invested at all times in facilities in
various stages of construction known as "construction work in
progress". The utility is permitted to charge interest on such work
but usually at a rate substantially less than a proper return, and
it is often impracticable for the company to charge interest on all
49 For example, electric utilities were required to reclassify the plant
investment to: Account 100.1-plant account, Account 100.5-plant acquisition

adjustments, and Account 100.7-plant adjustments.
0 Re Wheeling Electric Co., 31 PSC Ra,. 49 (1944); Re Monongahela Power
Co., 33 PSC RP. 34 (1945).
5lRe Arkansas Power &Light Co., 55 P.U.R. (N.s.) 129 (1944); Louisiana
Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Louisiana P. & L. Co., 65 P.U.R. (N.s.) 18 (1946); Re
Michigan Ass'n Telephone Co., 88 P.U.R. (N.s.) 15 (1951); Re Southern Bell
Telephone & Tel. Co., 91 P.U.R. (N.s.) 97 (1951).
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construction. The refusal of the commission to include the uncompleted construction work in the rate base appears to stem from
the theory that such property is not "used and useful". This test
originated in cases where the utility challenged rates as confiscatory
in the formative years of regulation when the reproduction cost
was the favored method for determining the rate base and the
"used and useful" standard was appropriate to this particular
method of valuation. 52 Under the original cost approach, however,
the concept of "used and useful" in its traditional sense has little,
if any, relevancy.5 3 The propriety of including construction work
in progress in the rate base under circumstances where interest
is not charged has been approved by many regulatory commissions
in recent cases.54
OPERATING EXPENSES

The valuation of the rate base was for many years the principal
area of dispute in rate proceedings. Recent cases, however, indicate a shift from rate base to operating expenses as the area of
controversy. Computation of expenses is likewise influenced by
the required accounting classifications. The test period is generally
the most recent twelve months' experience for which figures are
available, adjusted for changes which are known and measurable
with reasonable accuracy. Known nonrecurring items are eliminated
in an attempt to "normalize" the cost for the so-called test period.
Two troublesome problems concerning the allowance of operating expenses confront utilities under the jurisdiction of the
West Virginia commission. The first affects utilities which operate
in several jurisdictions and involves the proper allocation of costs
and expenses. Utilities, like many other businesses, have grown
across state lines. Under present day regulation, the federal commissions have jurisdiction over interstate rates and the rates for
local service within a state are subject to the jurisdiction of the
particular state in which the service is rendered.
For rate making
purposes, costs of service must be allocated to interstate and intrastate operations. The principle underlying a proper allocation is
the apportionment of costs which fairly measures the real use of
the facilities by customers in the respective jurisdictional areas.
52 See Washington Gas Light Co. v. Baker, 188 F.2d 11, 89 P.U.R. (N.s.)
177, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 952 (1951).
53 Ibid.
54 Re Potomac Electric Power Co., 89 P.U.R. (N.s.) 483 (1951); Re Southern
Utah Power Co., 78 P.U.R. (N.s.) 432 (1949); Re Jamaica Water Supply Co.,
N.Y.P.S.C. Case No. 14296 (decided July 13, 1949); Public Utilities Comm'n
v. Bangor Hydro-Elec. Co., 92 P.U.R. (N.s.) 46 (1952).
55
See note 12 supra.
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Allocations of cost must necessarily be dependent upon operating
and engineering data and many other factors. Since the Federal
Power Commission has tended to apply rather rigid formulas of
allocations by the grouping of operating expenses and costs of
facilities by service functions58 and since some state commissions
have frequently adopted a different formula, it is not uncommon
that a utility fails to recover its total cost of service. Moreover,
the West Virginia commission on occasion has accentuated the
problem by disallowing costs actually incurred pursuant to rates
57
subject to Federal Power Commission tariffs.
The second problem, and one which affects all utilities subject to the commission's jurisdiction, results from the rigid use of
the test period. Whereas rates are made for the future, they must
under the West Virginia commission's rule be based upon past
experience. Costs must be experienced to be included in the cost
of service, thereby creating a regulatory lag. The operating
expenses of a utility are not stable but subject to continuing
fluctuation, whereas rate proceedings before the commission approach the purported goal of reasonableness only for the period
covered by the cost of service. Whereas rates may be just and
reasonable at a given time, the dollar earnings that they, in fact,
produce are actually fictitious, since, with constantly rising costs for
labor and materials, coupled 'with continuous necessary expansion
of plant facilities, there is chronic attrition in earnings. A utility
never realizes all of its given rate of return, and as a result to
protect its economic position it must file again and again for rate
relief. It would, therefore, appear that the use of an inflexible
test period is inequitable and outmoded. A proper and fair cost
of service is not something that can be delicately balanced on
scales: Rates cannot be fixed with mathematical precision, but
should be established within a sensible zone of reasonableness. A
step taken in this direction by some commissions is the allowance
of commodity and other escalator clauses which provide the utility
with some hedge against inflation and the serious problems of regulatory lag. 8 Other commissions give consideration to items of cost
which, although they are not reflected during the test period, may
reasonably be expected to occur in the future. 9
56 See Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 282 U.S. 133 (1930).

57 Re Amere Gas Utilities Co., 1 P.U.R.3d 280 (1953).

Ss See The Adjustment Clause, an Aid to Rate Regulation, 53 P.U. FoRT.
465 (1954).
59 See Re Indiana Gas & Water Co., 77 P.U.R. (N.s.) 1 (1949); Re Pennsylvania P.U.C. v. Pennsylvania Tel. Corp., 86 P.U.R. (N.s.) 292 (1950). The
West Virginia and Federal Power Commissions strictly adhere to the test
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DEPRECIATION

The subject of depreciation is both complicated and controversial. The classic definition of its meaning is "the loss, not
restored by current maintenance, which is due to all factors causing
the ultimate retirement of the property, embracing wear and tear,
decay, inadequacy and obsolescence". 60 Unlike other utility expenses or deductions, it has a two-fold place in a rate case: (1) as an
annual charge or expense to prevent final consumption of the
utility investment; and (2) as an accrued reserve representing an
adjustment to the rate base for depreciation taken in prior years.
Since the early development of rate making, the necessity of making
adjustments for depreciation has never been seriously questioned,
but the method of computation often remains a disputed problem
in a rate case.
Originally, the West Virginia commission did not allow depreciation as an operating cost, but considered it as a part of the
allowance made to the utility for return upon investment and risks
incident to the business. 6 Utilities were required to keep their
depreciation accounts on a sinking fund basis, and no annual
charge was permitted. Since the late 1920's, however, the commission has recognized that an annual operating charge should be
allowed to take care of depreciation so that a sufficient balance will
accrue in the depreciation reserve for the purpose of protecting the
0
investor against loss occasioned by retirements. 2
The commission's present views on depreciation are largely
influenced by original cost accounting and stem from the Uniform
System of Accounts. Whereas originally fair value was the basis
for computation rather than book cost, the commission now requires that original cost be amortized through an annual allowance
for depreciation and depletion.63 The so-called "straight line"
method has become the accepted method of computing both the
annual charge and the reserve. By this method, the estimated
age-life of depreciable property is estimated and from this the
salvage value is deducted. The estimated life of the property
must be taken into account in determining the amortization rate
period and refuse to allow prospective expenses even if measurable by con-

tractual commitments.

60 Lindheimer v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 292 U.S. 151 (1934).
63 Re Southside Water Works Co., P.U.R. 1920D 752 (1920).
2Re United Fuel Gas Co., P.U.R. 1924A 357 (1923); Re W. Va. Central
Gas Co., P.U.R. 1924E (1924); Re Clarksburg Light & Heat Co., P.U.R. 1928B
290 (1927).
63.Re United Fuel Gas Co., P.U.R. 1925B 705

(1925); Re Cumberland &

Allegheny Gas Co., P.U.R. 1928B 20 (1927).
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and not the remaining life at the time of the rate case. The original
cost is then divided by the estimated age-life to determine the
permissible annual depreciation charge, which is usually computed
and allowed on the basis of a composite depreciation rate for all
depreciable property in the several plant accounts. This composite rate varies among utilities. The depreciation reserve established by the utility is adjusted to reflect proper accrued depredation when the rate base is first determined in a commission proceeding, booked and kept current by the commission's accounting
requirements. This method assumes that depredation progresses
yearly on a uniform basis, which is often contrary to fact.
Although the commission has recognized that the purpose and
function of the depreciation reserve and annual charge is to protect
the investment in utility plant and proper maintenance thereof
for public service, the purported accomplishment is illusory under
present commission practice. The use of the original cost for
amortization purposes fails to protect plant investment during
periods of sustained inflation. The "straight line" method computed according to original cost is fair to both investor and consumer in periods of stable currency, but is grossly unfair in times
of rising costs for replacements must be bought with inflated
dollars and effective purchasing power is diminished. A depreciation reserve to replace an item 6f plant costing many times its cost
of ten years ago, is obviously inadequate, and the equity of the
investor is in large measure confiscated. The inequitable results
currently reached would seem to require a reappraisal of permissible depreciation charges and reserve balances by the commission.
RATE oF RETURN

The rate of return is a judgment figure selected by the commission to produce reasonable earnings by the utility on a predetermined rate base. Operating expenses, taxes and depreciation
are deducted from revenues produced by existing rates. The net
revenue is then divided by the rate base which gives a percentage
figure, which is called the rate of return. If this return fails to
equal what is considered a "fair" return by the commission, tariffs
may be increased sufficiently to raise the rate of return to the
percentage considered proper.
Historically, the return is legally "fair" unless it results in
confiscation. The United States Supreme Court has required that
all relevant facts be considered in fixing the annual rate.64 The
64

See Bluefield Waterworks & Imp. Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 89 W.

Va. 736, 110 S.E. 205 (1921).
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West Virginia commission, with judicial sanction, has approached
the problem pragmatically.65 The orders of the commission indicate
that fair return is to be based upon existing circumstances and not
upon an arbitrary percentage.- The rate of return has varied from
case to case, 66 and few conclusions can be drawn from the results
other than the fact that this component of the rate formula seems
the most flexible in application. Generally, the commission has
used earnings of other regulated companies with comparable risk
instead of unregulated industry as the yardstick.
In recent years a shift has occurred in the meaning of "rate
of return". The West Virginia commission, along with others,
now considers return as an expense of doing business and thus an
essential part of the cost of service. This result has been caused
in large measure by the tremendous expansion of utility services
in the last two decades. The increased demands for service have
necessitated additional capital as a recurring item and the cost of
obtaining new money has, in effect, constituted an operating
expense. Rate of return has thus become a judgment figure
stated in a percentage which is designed to yield an amount to
those who have capital invested in the utility enterprise and constitutes payment for three things: (1) the risk taken by the investor; (2) the cost incurred in marketing securities and raising
new capital; and (3) pure interest. Among the problems encountered in arriving at the proper rate are the historical cost
of money for the particular utility as compared with the present
and prospective costs of money for future financing, the difficulty
of maintaining a proper debt-equity ratio, and the elusive problem
of compensation for the element of risk. Moreover, the return
should be sufficient to permit adequate maintenance and reasonable
additions to surplus to permit expansion and provide a hedge
against inflation. The majority of the orders of the commission
appear to limit rate of return to bare costs of money without
recognition of the need of appropriate transfers to surplus.
As long as the commission follows the principle of limiting the
rate of return to the historical cost of money, a utility has great
difficulty in improving its debt-equity ratio, and manifestly, the
attraction of new equity capital for expansion or other proper purposes may be seriously impaired. Stocks of utilities often sell
65 See C. & P. Tel. Co., 38 P.S.C. REP. 80 (1950), 39 P.S.C. REP. 67 (1951);
Huntington v. Public Service Comm'n, 101 W. Va. 378, 133 S.E. 144 (1926;
Wheeling v. Natural Gas Co., 115 W. Va. 149, 175 S.E. 339 (1934).
6 Although 6% appears to constitute the present norm, the rate varies
according to utility, capital structure, market conditions, and expediency.
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below current market trends under these circumstances, and, sometimes, even in the case of a well managed company, at less than
book value. The commission, in recognition of these problems,
has in a few recent cases, departed in some measure from its rather
fixed views as to rate of return and has allowed net earnings slightly
in excess of six per cent.
CONCLUSION

Original cost rate making presents serious problems, only a
few of which have been mentioned. In most respects, original
cost accounting, as the fixed standard for rate making, is both
reasonable and appealing. Since utilities are required to keep
their accounts upon such basis, many complexities and delays
inherent in the controversial reproduction cost new rate base are
avoided. The chief difficulty with original cost, as the sole
standard for rate making, is its inflexibility to meet rapidly changing
economic conditions. It involves a backward look whereas rates
must be made for the future. In a period of rapid inflation or
deflation, as the case may be, original cost is likely to be too fixed
and inflexible for arriving at fair and just rates. The period
of stable economic conditions is seldom of long duration, and
during the current period of rising prices since World War II,
the common stockholder of ia utility has lost heavily on two
counts because of the original cost formula. The investors' real
capital is not maintained intact because the consumer pays rates
that do not compensate fairly for the value of property used in
rendering the service and the equity investor faces the necessity
in an expanding business of either providing new capital or taking
on new partners to finance high cost construction. Secondly, the
shareholder loses because of inflation: he invested a 100 cents
dollar and receives only a 48 cents dollar in the form of dividends.
While not yet apparent in this state, some courts in other jurisdictions have recently appeared to be more aware of the equity in the
67

true fair value concept.

It is submitted that as long as the current rate making
philosophy of the West Virginia commission is purely a mechanical
process, geared solely to a strict bookkeeping basis, an ominous
threat exists to realistic regulation which is necessary to sustain
the growth of the utility business with fair and equal treatment to
both the investor and consumer. Anyone who intelligently invests
in a utility is concerned not only with the quantity of dividends
67 See note 15 supra.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1955

19

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 57, Iss. 1 [1955], Art. 3
RATE MAKING
but the quality thereof and the regulatory climate has much to do
with an investor's willingness or unwillingness to provide equity
capital for the tremendous expansion common to all utilities during
the past ten years. It has become increasingly more difficult to
finance such growth and if the inflationary trend continues, strict
adherence to the original cost concept could cripple, if not ultimately destroy, private enterprise in the utility field.
That the commission is confronted with a formidable task in
rate regulation cannot be gainsaid. Irrespective of the formulas
and procedures followed, it is impossible to fix a rate which is perfectly fair to both the consumer and the utility. The commission
must weigh countless factors, tangible and intangible. The general
economic outlook must be appraised, as well as the economics
peculiar to the business of the applicant. No two rate cases are
alike because of wide variations in plant, sales, growth potential
and financial and operational problems even among utilities engaged in the same public service within a similar area. In these
times of rapid expansion of public services at highly inflated cost
the commission has been deluged with an unprecedented number
of rate cases, many of which have raised difficult questions of first
impression in this state. Its technical staff is overworked. The
commission is plagued by the pleas of the utilities, on the one
hand, and the clamor of the consumer and public, on the other.
-Mayors and other politicians sometimes see advantages to intervening in rate cases. The public generally is inclined to oppose
rate increases, particularly since it gives vicarious relief to the
frustrating experience of encountering inflated prices at every turn.
These factors, coupled with the reluctance of the Supreme
Court of Appeals to establish guiding principles for the benefit of
the commission and parties in interest, have understandably resulted in a conservative and rather inflexible regulatory climate in
this state.6 The consumer may get an immediate advantage, but
in the long run, service is likely to be impaired by curtailment of
additions and betterments. There are no ready panaceas and the
complexities are formidable. The problem demands continuing
study by the commission, practitioners and the informed public.

68It now appears that the commission will no longer grant interim rate
relief, despite its former practice, sanctioned by the Supreme Court of Appeals.
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